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also adjust the phase-outs, it will also increase the number of families
already receiving a marriage bonus. As my research has shown, that
means we are talking about White households, disproportionately
upper income White households who are receiving the marriage
bonus. 5 This proposal, while eliminating the marriage penalty, would
assist African-American dual-earner couples by reducing their tax
liability. However, it will not do anything to increase the number of
African-American households receiving the marriage bonus, until
African-Americans earn sufficient wages to allow for an increase in
the number of African-American single-wager-earner households.
In conclusion, while it is important to eliminate the marriage
penalty, it is more important, to me, for husbands and wives to make
decisions about labor force participation without the influence of
Federal Tax Laws. What would the average American household
look like if men and women, African-Americans and Whites, all
earned the same wages, would we see more women who are sole
wage-earners, more stay-at-home dads? How much of what we see
today is merely a societal construct reinforced by and reflected in the
Internal Revenue Code? Whatever legislative solution is made to
solve the marriage bonus/penalty issue, one must consider the
differences in American households. Thank you.
PROF. BECK: Thank you very much, Dorothy, for a very,
very interesting presentation. Your data is certainly new to me. Our
next panelist is Professor Amy Christian.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF: THE
EFFECT ON THE MARRIED COUPLE'S CHOICE OF FILING STATUS
Professor Amy C. Christian
PROF. CHRISTIAN:** First, I would like to thank New York
5 See id.
B.S.B.A. 1988, Georgetown University; J.D. 1991, Harvard Law School.
A member of both the California and District of Columbia Bars, Professor Christian has
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Law School and the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights
for sponsoring this symposium on the important topics of the marriage
penalty, the tax treatment of child care expenses, and Social Security
reform, and the effect of these three areas of Federal Tax Policy upon
women. The School should be commended, in my view, for fostering
discussion and for bringing increased exposure to these issues.
Senate majority leader Trent Lott recently referred to his
interest in reducing the marriage penalty. He stated: "We have to do it
now - my daughter's ready to get married."6  The recent spate of
attempts to enact marriage penalty relief by Senator Lott and others in
the 10 5th Congress seems, on its face, laudable. After all, why should
the exchange of marriage vows have tax consequences? 8 Be that as it
may, many proposals for marriage penalty relief are structured in a
manner that creates unintended consequences - consequences with
significant risks for the proposals' intended beneficiaries, including
Senator Lott's daughter.
My focus of inquiry today will be on how marriage penalty
practiced tax controversy and tax planning with Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C.
While at Harvard Law School, she worked in the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance
program as well as in the Poverty Law Clinic. She has published a variety of articles in
the area of tax law, including articles appearing in the University of Cincinnati Law
Review, the University of Virginia's Journal of Law & Politics, the Southern California
Review of Law and Women's Studies and the UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and
Policy. Professor Christian teaches Basic Income Taxation, International Tax, and Estate
& Gift Tax at the Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law.
6 Senator Trent Lott, Address at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce breakfast
(Jan. 27, 1999), quoted in THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1999, at 11.
See, e.g., S. 2147, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998); H.R. 3524, 105th Cong. § 1
(1998); Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711, 105th Cong.
§§ 2-3 (1998); Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
8 See, e.g., Harvey E. Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 223 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980)
(criticizing the marriage penalty and advocating marriage neutrality); Dorothy A. Brown,
The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45-57 (Karen B.
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (criticizing the marriage penalty for its
disparate impact on African-Americans); Douglas K. Chapman, Marriage Neutrality: An
Old Idea Comes of Age, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 335 (1985); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning
Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8
(1980) (arguing that total tax should not change upon marriage); Patricia Cain, Sexual
Identity in Tax & Theory, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: A WORKSHOP (Sept. 8, 1995)
(questioning whether "marriage" should be treated as a tax-relevant event).
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relief proposals affect a couple's choice of filing status. That is, how
do the various relief proposals affect a married couple's decision of
whether to file jointly or separately? As you know, the current rate
structure encourages most couples to file joint returns, rather than
separate ones, by establishing a lower tax liability under the joint
return. 9  Predictably, of course, most couples file jointly.'0  The
question I will address, then, is how the proposals for marriage
penalty relief affect this incentive. Although this question is usually
overlooked in debates surrounding the marriage penalty, it is,
nevertheless, an important one.'1  After all, significant legal
9 See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and
Several Liability for Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 372
(1990) (explaining that "[tihe tax system is designed almost to force married persons to
file jointly, rather than separately."); Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and
the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 601-02 (1998)
[hereinafter Christian, Liability]; Amy C. Christian, Joint Versus Separate Filing: Joint
Return Tax Rates and Federal Complicity in Directing Economic Resources from Women
to Men, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 443, 447-48 (1997) [hereinafter Christian,
Complicity]; Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 269-71 (1997)
[hereinafter Christian, Rate Structure]; Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint
Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 425 (1977).
In 1993, an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were
joint returns, and an estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These estimates
were derived from IRS statistics on the number of joint returns filed and the number of
separate returns filed. In 1993, 48,298,687 returns in which spouses filed jointly were
submitted, to the IRS. See I.R.S., Pub. 1304, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1993 INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS 35 tbl. l.3 (1996). Only 2,437,311 separate returns were filed by
married taxpayers. See id Consequently, the total number of returns filed by married
taxpayers can be estimated to be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687 or 95.2% were joint
returns. When one spouse files separately, the other may also file separately or not at all
depending on whether that other spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing
requirement. An estimate of the number of such couples would be half of the number of
separate returns filed in 1993 or half of 2,437,311. This is not a precise estimate,
however, because undoubtedly some spouses of separate filers did not file separately or at
all on their own behalf. Nevertheless, assuming 1,218,656 couples filed separately, the
total number of married couples who filed returns would amount to 49,517,343 and the
percentage of couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as 48,298,687 divided
by the total number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this manner, the percentage
of couples who filed jointly could be estimated at 97.5%.
11 Discussion of the marriage penalty usually focuses on other questions like
the following. Should concerns for marriage neutrality outweigh the goals underlying
couples neutrality or progressivity? See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
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consequences flow from the decision of whether to file jointly or
separately. What are those consequences? There are many. The one
I will focus on today is the sometimes severe inequity attending the
rule of joint and several liability. When a married couple files jointly,
it is treated as .consenting, whether or not the spouses know it, to joint
and several liability.' 2  That is, the Internal Revenue Service can
collect a tax deficiency from one spouse even if that deficiency was
generated by the other spouse. A spouse can sometimes escape the
pernicious effects of joint and several liability, but only if he or she
qualifies for relief under the very narrowly tailored, and in many
respects inadequate, "innocent spouse" rules of section 6015.13
Now, why is the joint and several liability that accompanies
joint filing a problem? First, joint and several liability is problematic
on its face because it requires one person to pay a tax generated by
another.' 4 In addition, as Professor Richard Beck has established, the
system of joint and several liability applies more frequently and more
onerously against women than it does against men.' 5  Finally, joint
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1395-96, 1429-31 (1975). Whom does the
marriage penalty tend to burden? Whom does the marriage bonus usually benefit? See,
e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 45-57 (arguing that African Americans tend to experience a
marriage penalty, while white Americans are more likely to experience a marriage bonus).
Does marriage penalty relief constitute a penalty on single taxpayers? While these
questions are important, the issue of how the relief proposals might affect a married
couple's decision of whether to file jointly or separately is also important.
12 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
13See I.R.C. § 6015 (1999). See Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New
Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand'?, TAX NOTEs,
Aug. 17, 1998, at 835-49 (discussing various ways in which the new § 6015 innocent
spouse rules provide inadequate relief).
14 See, e.g., Christian, Liability, supra note 9, at 536, 592-93.
15 See Beck, supra note 9, at 320 & n.4, 327-28 n.34 (estimating that
approximately 90% of the collections from the spouse who did not generate the
deficiency penalized women and that only 10% penalized men). See also Jerome
Borison, Alice Through a Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from
the Tax Court in Innocent Spouse Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q. 123, 125 (1996); Christian,
Liability, supra note 9, at 593-98; H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040: Joint Returns Mean Joint
Liability - And In Some Cases, That Means Trouble, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, available
in 1994 WL 7442627; Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and
Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 421, 424-25 (1996); Lisa K. Edison-Smith, Comment, "If You Love Me, You '1 Sign
My Tax Return ": Spousal Joint and Several Liability for Federal Income Taxes and the
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and several liability contributes to systemic bias in the tax code -
bias which also tends to be directed against women. 16  What is an
example of systemic bias? Well, under the tax code, the incentive to
file jointly is strongest for couples in which spouses' incomes differ;
the more they differ, the greater the incentive to use the joint return.1 7
Because joint and several liability applies only when couples file
jointly, and because the incentive to file jointly is strongest for
couples in which spouses' incomes differ, joint and several liability is
designed in such a way as to apply with the greatest frequency when
one spouse, usually the husband, earns significantly more than the
other, usually the wife.' 8 This situation of unequal spousal resources
is precisely when it is least fair to impose joint and several liability. 19
In general, this significant defect or bias persists under most of
the marriage penalty proposals that were before Congress during the
last two years. 20 Marriage penalty relief proposals do not address the
problem of joint and several liability. Indeed, most of those proposals
would make the joint return even more attractive than it already is.
Under those proposals, even more couples would file jointly rather
than separately. Even more couples would find themselves locked
into a joint return and the resulting specter of joint and several
liability. The intended beneficiaries of marriage penalty relief,
perhaps even Senator Lott's own daughter, may find themselves more
likely to face an unintended consequence: being' held liable for
spouse's tax liability.
I have analyzed the various proposals for marriage penalty
relief introduced in the 10 5 th Congress and especially their probable
"Innocent Spouse" Exception, 18 HAMLINE L. REv. 102, 119, 123-24 (1994).
16 See Christian, Liability, supra note 9, at 536-37, 598-615 (exposing three
examples of systemic bias, instances in which the rule of joint and several liability
interacts with other provisions of the tax code to create bias against women).
17 See Christian, Liability, supra note 9, at 601-02; Christian, Complicity,
supra note 9, at 447-48; Christian, Rate Structure, supra note 9, at 269-71. In general,
this pattern would remain true under the congressional proposals for marriage penalty
relief.
18 See Christian, Liability, supra note 9, at 604-09.
See id. at 605.
20 See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
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effects on a married couple's decision to file jointly or separately.
While I discuss most of the proposals in an article I am preparing in
conjunction with this symposium, I will analyze a few of the bills here
today. Some bills would alter the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC).21 Of these, none changes the current requirement that to be
eligible for the credit, married taxpayers must a file joint return. 22
Thus, the EITC remains a provision of the tax code that makes joint
returns relatively attractive and separate returns relatively unattractive.
This tipping of benefits in favor of joint returns plainly compounds
the incentive for married couples to file jointly, not separately. As a
result, more married couples in the lower-income tax brackets must
use joint returns to get the credit and more, thus, become subject to
the regime of joint and several liability. 23 With regard to proposals
that attempt to offer marriage penalty relief through a deduction or
credit,24 in each case, the availability of the tax preference is
21 See H.R. 3995, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998); Universal Tobacco Settlement
Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997), (Amendment No. 2686 to Amendment No. 2437
offered by Mr. Gramm on June 10, 1998).
22 See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1999) ("in the case of an individual who is married
(within the meaning of section 7703), this section shall apply only if ajoint return is filed
for the taxable year under section 6013.").
23 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). This problem is significantly worse than
this speech suggests. Those eligible for the EITC are generally individuals who fall into
the lowest marginal tax bracket. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2) (limiting and phasing out the credit
as income rises). Under normal circumstances, those low-bracket individuals would have
no incentive arising from the rate structure to file jointly rather than separately. They
would not experience the benefits of income splitting or the burden of income aggregation
that exist in the joint return rates because they generally fall in the lowest tax bracket.
Under normal circumstances, those individuals would be free to file separately, rather
than jointly, and, thus, would be able to avoid joint and several liability altogether. The
EITC, however, ensures that these low-income couples must file jointly and results not
merely in a slight increase in the number of couples subject to joint and several liability,
but in a large increase in the number of couples so subject.
24 See S. 2147, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998) (proposing a two-earner deduction);
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997), Amendment No. 2688
to Amendment No. 2437 offered by Mr. Daschle on June 10, 1998 (proposing a deduction
for two-earner married couples); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. §
2 (1997) (proposing a deduction for two-earner married couples); Tax Freedom for
Families Act of 1997, H.R. 1584, 105th Cong. § 202 (1997) (proposing a credit to reduce
a couple's marriage penalty).
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conditioned on using a joint return.25 The deduction or credit would
not be available at all to a couple in which the spouses file separately.
Consequently, these proposals directly exacerbate the incentive to file
jointly rather than separately and would inevitably result in more
couples filing jointly, thereby subjecting them to joint and several
liability.
As most of you probably already know from the previous
panel's discussion today, a primary cause of the marriage penalty is
the structure of tax rates. 26 The rates for couples who file joint returns
and the rates that apply to single people relate to each other so that
some couples, those in which spouses' incomes are similar,
experience a marriage penalty. 27 At the same time, however, other
couples - those in which the spouses' incomes differ - actually get
a marriage bonus.28  Most of the proposals introduced in the 10 5 th
Congress attempt to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty by
altering the rate structure. Virtually all of the proposals of this sort
adjust rates in a way that retains the incentive to file jointly. In fact,
many of the proposals increase the likelihood that a couple will file
jointly and be subject to joint and several liability.
One group of these proposals 29 addresses the marriage penalty
by permitting married spouses to file jointly, separately, or, in effect,
25 See S. 2147, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998) (proposing new I.R.C. § 222(a): "In
the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as
a deduction an amount..."); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong.
(1997), Amendment No. 2688 to Amendment No. 2437 offered by Mr. Daschle on June
10, 1998 (proposing new I.R.C. § 222(a): "In the case of ajoint return under section 6013
for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount ..."); Marriage
Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (proposing new I.R.C. § 222(a):
"In the case of a joint return for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an
amount ..."); Tax Freedom for Families Act of 1997, H.R. 1584, 105th Cong. § 202
(1997) (proposing new I.R.C. § 24A(a): "in the case of a joint return for the taxable year,
there shall be allowed as a credit...").
26 See, e.g., Christian, Rate Structure, supra note 9, at 272-73 & n. 118.
27 See id at 273-76.
28 See id. at 275.
29 See Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711,
105th Cong. (1998); Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Cong. (1997);
Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. (1997); Marriage Tax Elimination
Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2462, 105th Cong. (1997).
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as if the spouses were single. The husband and wife can choose
whichever of these three statuses gives them the lowest tax liability.
The single filing status option is achieved by offering married couples
the new option of filing a combined return in which tax liability is
computed, in effect, as if the two spouses were single. 30 Under each
of the proposals taking this approach, the new, combined return is
treated as a joint return and triggers joint and several liability. 31
Under this group of proposals, how will couples file assuming
the spouses choose the status that minimizes their combined tax
liability? Disparate-income couples will continue to file the
traditional joint return since, for them, the joint return rates are lower
than single return rates. Once incomes converge enough to create a
marriage penalty under the joint return, however, couples will switch
to the new, combined return to get the benefit of the lower rates that
apply to single individuals. Similar-income couples will choose the
new, combined return that approximates being single, while disparate-
income couples will continue to file the traditional joint return. This
group of proposals eliminates the marriage penalty without
eliminating marriage bonuses.
Unfortunately, however, this approach to marriage penalty
relief will cause joint and several liability to apply to more couples.
Disparate-income couples will continue to file the traditional joint
return and be subject to joint and several liability. Under the proposed
laws, similar- and equal-income couples would have an incentive to
file the new, combined return as if they were single, rather than filing
30 In each proposal, see supra note 29, taxable income is allocated between
the spouses in a manner that approaches their taxable incomes if they were single. Once
these taxable incomes are determined for each spouse, tax liability is computed in the
combined return by applying single rates to each separate taxable income, then by adding
the two liabilities together.
31 In each of the bills cited in note 29, supra, the following provision
appears:
(E) Treatment as a Joint Return. - Except as otherwise provided
in this section or in the regulations prescribed hereunder, for
purposes of this title (other than sections I and 63(c)) a
combined return under this section shall be treated as a joint
return.
Thus, for purposes of I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the new, combined return would be treated as a
joint return and would trigger joint and several liability.
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jointly and rather than filing separately which had occasionally
advantaged them before. So they would be more likely to face joint
and several liability with the new, combined return, whereas if they
had filed separately - as was sometimes advantageous under prior
law 32 - joint and several liability would not have been triggered.
Under the proposals, some couples, especially those in which spouses'
earnings are close, are even more likely than under current law to
choose a filing status that imposes joint and several liability.
Altering the Code to solve one problem, the marriage penalty,
can have the unintended consequence of increasing the prevalence of
other problems, in this case joint and several liability. The obvious
solution to the problem of an increased incidence of joint and several
liability is for Congress to repeal joint and several liability, not for it
to avoid enacting marriage penalty relief. However, despite recent
American Bar Association and American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) recommendations to eliminate joint and several
liability, 33 Congress has declined to repeal it. 34 It appears that joint
and several liability will persist in the immediate future, unfortunate
32 See, e.g., Christian, Liability, supra note 9, at 602 & n.308; Christian, Rate
Structure, supra note 9, at 271-72 & nn. 113-14.
33In February of 1995, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the following
resolution:
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to
the Congress that sections 6013(d) and (e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 be repealed (i) to eliminate joint and
several liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return with
his or her spouse for tax on income properly attributable to his or
her spouse, (ii) to substitute separate liability for tax shown to be
due on the joint return, and (iii) to repeal innocent spouse relief
from liability for tax on the joint return when the liability arises
from erroneous items of the taxpayer's spouse.
Domestic Relations Comm., ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Comments on Liability of Divorced
Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, reprinted in 50 TAX
LAW. 395, 395(1997).
In comments submitted to the IRS, the AICPA also recommended repealing
joint and several liability, or, in the alternative, eliminating joint returns altogether. See
Ken Rankin, AJCPA Advises IRS on Fairer Divorce Procedures, 10 ACCT. TODAY, July
29, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL 8970070.
34 See I.R.C. §§ 6013(d)(3), 6015 (1999) which retain the regime of joint and
several liability..
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as that is. Given that, it is essential that Congress also consider the
effects that any marriage penalty relief proposal has on the choice of
filing status, and thus, on the likelihood that joint and several liability
will apply. Only by this consideration can Congress also avoid the
unintended consequences of worsening some aspects of the tax law
while attempting to improve others. Thank you.
PROF. BECK: Thank you very much Professor Christian.
You picked a subject dear to my heart. I have always thought that
both forms of spousal liability are a species of marriage penalty. The
Poe v. Seaborn35 liability which makes wives liable for half their
husband's taxes when they file separately, and the joint and several
liability on the joint return both apply only to married persons. They
are in and of themselves both a form of marriage penalty. It is a
different penalty than the rate penalty, but the liability rules are a
penalty too which is something that I am sure that we will come back
to later. Our next speaker is Bill LaPiana.
MODERN COVERTURE: OLD WINE IN OLD BOTTLES
William P. LaPiana
PROF. LaPIANA:**** Good morning. Any discussion of men,
women, marriage, family and taxation is bound to be contentious
35 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
Professor William LaPiana is the Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of
Wills, Trusts, and Estates at New York Law School and a member of the American Law
Institute. A.B., 1973, M.A., 1975, J.D., 1978, Ph.D., 1987, Harvard University. Adjunct
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 1979; Associate, Davis Polk &
Wardwell, 1979-83; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, 1983-87.
Author, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION,
1800-1920 (Oxford University Press, 1994); NEW YORK WILLS & TRUSTS (with McQuaid
& Streng) (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 3d ed. 1990); DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING
(with Brand) (Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, ABA, 1990); Thoughts
and Lives, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 607 (1994); Just the Facts: The Field Code and the
Case Method, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (1991); Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver
Wendell Holmes's Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1990).
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